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PETITIONER: A.K. JAIN & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 25/07/1969

BENCH: HEGDE, K.S. BENCH: HEGDE, K.S. SIKRI, S.M. MITTER, G.K.

CITATION:  1970 AIR  267            1970 SCR  (1) 673  1969 SCC  (2) 340  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1974 SC1533  (21)

ACT:       Essential  Commodities  Act,  1955,  s.   3--Sugarcane (Control)  Order 1955 Rule 3(3)---Offence if purchaser  does not   pay   price  of   sugarcane   purchased,   within   14 days--Validity of rule--Whether s. 3 of  Act deals with food crops or only with foodstuffs---Competence of  Parliament to pass  s.  3--Effect of Bihar Sugar  Factories  Control  Act, 1947--Fundamental  right under Art.  19(1) of   Constitution whether    affected   by  impugned   rule--Offence   whether cognizable  within  meaning of s. 4(1)(f) Code  of  Criminal Procedure.

HEADNOTE:       The  appellants  were the office bearers  of  a  sugar concern.  A complaint with the police was registered against them  under sub-rule 3 of Rule’3 of the Sugarcane  (Control) Order, 1955 read with s. 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955,  On  the  ground that they had failed to  pay  to  the sellers  within  the  time  prescribed  the  price  of   the sugarcane purchased by them. Objecting to the  investigation of the alleged offence the appellants filed a writ  petition under  Art.  226  of the Constitution but  the  High  Court’ refused  to interfere.  By special leave they came  to  this Court.   The contentions urged on behalf of  the  appellants were  (i)  that  sub-rule 3 of rule 3 could  not  have  been validly  issued under s. 3 of the Essential Commodities  Act because  the latter section applied only to  foodstuffs  and not  to food crops (ii) that the regulation of the price  of sugarcane  being  expressly dealt with by  the  Bihar  Sugar Factories  Control  Act, 1937 the same power  could  not  by implication  be spelt out from the provisions of  the  Order and  the  Act, (iii) that Parliament had  no  competence  to enact  any law relating to the control of sugarcane as  that subject was within the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of the  State, the same being a part of agriculture. (iv)  that there  was  violation of the fundamental  right  under  Art. 19(1) of the Constitution by the impugned order. (v) that in view of s. 11 of the Act no cognizance could have been taken

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of  the  offence, (vi) that the complaint  made  before  the police did not disclose a cognizabIe offence and as such the police was not empowered to  investigate the complaint.     HELD:  (i) In view of the scheme of ss. 2 and 3  of  the Act and the judgment of this Court in Ch. Tika Ramji’s  case the  contention that food crops were outside the purview  of s. 3 of the  Act  must  be  rejected. [675 B--G]     Ch.  Tika  Ramji & Ors. v. State o/U.P.  &  Ors.  [1956] S.C.R. 432, applied.    (ii) The power sought to be exercised in the present case was  not  implied  one for sub-rule (3) of rule  3  gives  a specific  mandate  that  unless there  is  an  agreement  in writing  to the contrary between the parties  the  purchaser shall pay to the seller the price of the sugarcane purchased within 14 days. [676 G-H] 674      Even  if the Bihar Sugar Factories Control,  Act,  1937 provides  anything to the contrary it must be held  to  have been  altered  by a competent authority  namely  Parliament, under Art, 372 of the Constitution. [677 A-B]     (iii)  Parliament was competent to enact  the  Essential Commodities Act and to confer power on the Government  under s. 3 of the Act as Entry 33 of List III of the  Constitution empowers  Parliament to legislate in respect of  production, supply and distribution of foodstuffs. [677 C-D]     (iv) There was no contravention of Art. 19(1) because no fundamental  right  is conferred on a buyer not to  pay  the price  of  the  goods purchased by him or to  pay  the  same whenever he pleases. [677 E]     (v)  The  plea based on s. 11 of the Act  was  premature because no ,court had yet taken cognizance of the case. [677 F]     (vi) The offence complained of was punishable with three years’ imprisonment and fell within the 2nd Schedule of  the Code  of Criminal Procedure.  It was therefore a  cognizable offence as defined in s. 4(1)(f) of the Code.  [677 G]

JUDGMENT:     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 189 of 1966.     Appeal  by  special leave from the  judgment  and  order dated  July  4,  1966 of the Patna High  Court  in  Criminal W.J.C. No. 11 of 1966.     B.R.L. lyengar and U.P. Singh, for the appellants.     V.  A. Seyid Muhammad  and  S.P. Nayar,  for  respondent No. 1.     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     Hegde  J. This appeal against the decision of  the  High Court of Patna in Criminal W.J.C. No. 11 of 1966 was brought after   obtaining  special  leave  from  this  Court.    The principal   question   raised   herein   is   whether    the investigation   which  is  being  carried  on  against   the ’appellants  under  sub-rule  (3 ) of rule  3  of  Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1955 (to be hereinafter referred to as the Order) read with s. 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (to be hereinafter referred to as the Act) is in  accordance with law.   The  appellants are office bearers of M/s.  S.K.G.  Sugar, Ltd.(Lauriya).  A complaint has been registered against them under sub-rule (3) of rule 3 of the Order read with s. 7  of the  Act on the ground that they have failed to pay  to  the sellers the price of the sugarcane purchased by them, within the    time   prescribed.  The  said  complaint   is   being

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investigated.    The  appellants  are  objecting   to   that investigation  on  various  grounds.   They   unsuccessfully sought  ’the intervention of the High Court of  Patna  under Art.  226 of the Constitution in Cr. W.I.C. No. 11 of  1966. Hence this appeal. 675       Mr.  B.R.L.  Iyengar  appearing  for  the   appellants challenged  the validity of the investigation in question on various grounds. We shall now proceed to deal with each  one of those grounds.      The 1st contention of Mr. Iyengar was that sub-rule (3) of  rule 3 could not have been validly issued under s. 3  of the  Act. According to him the said s. 3 cannot be used  for controlling  the payment of the price of food crops; it  can only deal with foodstuffs; food crops are outside its scope. This  contention has been negatived by the High  Court.   We agree  with  the High Court that there is no merit  in  this contention.   Section  2(a) of the  Act  defines  "essential commodity".  Sub-cl. (v) of that clause brings..  foodstuffs within the definition of essential commodity. Clause (b)  of s.  2 provides that food-crops include sugarcane.  The  next important  provisions in the Act are cls. (b) and (c) of  s. 3(1). Section 3 (1 ) provides that if the Central Government is  of opinion, that it is necessary or expedient so  to  do for  maintaining  or increasing supplies  of  any  essential commodity  or for securing their equitable distribution  and availability  at fair prices, it may, by order, provide  for regulating  or   prohibiting  the  production,.  supply  and distribution thereof and trade and commerce therein.  Sub-s. (2)of  that  section  says that without  prejudice  to  the. generality of the _powers conferred by sub-s. (I ) an  order made. thereunder may provide  .....                   "(b)  for bringing under  cultivation  any               waste or arable land, whether appurtenant to a               building  or not, for the growing  thereon  of               food-crops  generally  or of  specified  food-               crops,   and  for  otherwise  maintaining   or               increasing’  the  cultivation  of   food-crops               generally, or of specified food-crops;"  Clause (c) provides for controlling the price at which  any essential commodity may be bought or sold.  From the  scheme of cls. (b) and (c) of s. 2 and s. 3 of the Act, it is clear that  the  Parliament intended to bring  under  control  the cultivation  and’  sale  of food-crops.  In  view  of  these provisions  it  is idle to contend that sugarcane  does  not come  within the ambit of the Act. The question whether  the cultivation and sale of sugarcane can be regulated under  s. 3 of the Act came up for the consideration of this Court  in Ch.  Tika  Ramji  and Ors. etc. v. The  State  of  U.P.  and Ors.(1)  At pages 432 and 433 of the report it is observed :                   "Act   X  of  1955  included  within   the               definition  of essential commodity  foodstuffs               which we have  seen above would include  sugar               as well as sugarcane.  This Act was enacted by               Parliament in exercise. of’ the con- (1)  [1956] S.C.R. 432. 676 current  legislative  power under’ Entry 33 of List  III  as amended  by  the. Constitution Third  Amendment  Act,  1954. Foodcrops were there defined as including crops of sugarcane and  section  3 (1 ) gave the Central Government  powers  to control the production, supply and distribution of essential commodities  and trade and commerce therein for  maintaining or  increasing  the supplies thereof or for  securing  their equitable  distribution  and availability  at  fair  prices.

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Section 3(2)(b) empowered the Central Government to  provide inter  alia  for  bringing under cultivation  any  waste  or arable  land  whether appurtenant to a building or  not  for growing   thereon  of  foodcrops  generally   or   specified foodcrops  and section 3(2)(c) gave the  Central  Government power  for  controlling  the price at  which  any  essential commodity  may  be bought or sold.  These  provisions  would certainly bring within the scope of Central legislation  the regulation  of  the  production of  sugarcane  as  also  the controlling of the price at which sugarcane may be bought or sold, and in addition to the Sugar Control Order, 1955 which was  issued by the Central Government on 27th August,  1955, it  also  issued the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955,  on  the same  date investing it with the power to fix the  price  of sugarcane  and direct payment thereof as also the  power  to regulate the movement of sugarcane.     Parliament was well within its powers in legislating  in regard to sugarcane and the Central Government was also well within  its powers in issuing the Sugarcane  Control  Order, 1955  in the manner it did because all this was in  exercise of  the  concurrent power of legislation under Entry  33  of List III."     It is needless to say anything more on this question.     It was next contended by Mr. Iyengar that the regulation of  the  price of sugarcane is expressly dealt with  by  the Bihar  Sugar  Factories Control Act, 1937 and  therefore  we should  not  impliedly  spell out the same  power  from  the provisions  of  the Order and the Act.  Mr. Iyengar  is  not right  in  contending that the power that is  sought  to  be exercised  in the instant case is an implied one.   Sub-rule (3) of rule 3 specifically provides that unless there is  an agreement in writing to the contrary between the parties the purchaser shall pay to the seller the price of the sugarcane purchased  within 14 days from the date of the  delivery  of the  sugarcane.  This is a .specific mandate.  If the  Bihar Act provides anything to the contrary the same must be  held to have been 677 altered  in  view  of Art. 372  of  the  Constitution  which provides  that all laws in force in the territory  of  India immediately  before  the commencement of  this  Constitution shall continue in force therein until altered or repealed or amended  by  a  competent  legislature  or  other  competent authority.    Quite  clearly  the  Bihar  Act  is   a   pre- Constitution Act and it could have continued to be in  force only  till  it  was  altered,  repealed  o.r  amended  by  a competent  legislature  or other  competent  authority.   We shall  presently  see  that the authority  that  altered  or amended that law is a competent one.     The  next  contention  of the learned  Counsel  for  the appellants  was  that the Parliament had  no  competence  to enact  any law relating to the control of sugarcane as  that subject is within the exclusive legislative jurisdiction  of the  State,  the  same being a part  of  agriculture.   This contention  is  again unsustainable in view of Entry  33  of List  III of the Constitution which empowers the  Parliament to   legislate   in  respect  of  production,   supply   and distribution  of  foodstuffs.  It is not disputed  that  the Parliament  had  declared-by  law that it  is  expedient  in public  interest  that  it  should  exercise  control   over foodstuffs.  That being so it was well within the competence of Parliament to enact the Act and hence the power conferred on  the  Government  ,under  s.  3  of  the  Act  cannot  be challenged as invalid.     There  is  no  substance  in  the  contention  that  the

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impugned order contravenes the fundamental right  guaranteed to the citizens under Art. 19 (1 ).  No fundamental fight is conferred  on  a  buyer not to pay the price  of  the  goods purchased by him or to pay the same whenever he pleases.     The  contention  that in view of s. 11 of  the  Act,  no cognizance  could have been taken of the offence alleged  is premature.   This question does not arise in this  ease.  No court has yet taken cognizance of the case.  That stage  has Still to come.     There  is  no  substance  in  the  contention  that  the complaint  made  before  the  police  does  not  disclose  a Cognizable  offence  and as such the police could  not  have taken  up the investigation of that complaint.  The  offence complained  of is punishable with three years’  imprisonment and as such it falls within the 2nd Sch. of the Cr. P.C. and consequently the same is a cognizable offence as defined  in s. 4(1)(f) of the Cr. P.C.  Hence it was open to the  police to investigate the same.     For the reasons mentioned above we are unable to  accept any of the contention advanced on behalf of the  appellants. In the result this appeal fails and the same is dismissed. G.C.                                     Appeal dismissed. 678