REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.   4972        OF 2009 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.9576 of 2005)

A. Abdul Farook … Appellant

Versus

Municipal Council, Perambalur & Ors. … Respondents

WITH  

CIVIL APPEAL NO.    4973        OF 2009 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.9577 of 2005)

J U D G M E N T

S.B. Sinha, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. Interpretation  and/or  application  of  Section  26  of  the  Tamil  Nadu  

Highways Act, 2001 (hereinafter referred to for the sake of brevity as ‘the  

said Act’) is in question in this appeal.  It arises out of a judgment and order

dated 21.3.2005 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature  

at  Madras in Writ  Petition No.6820 of 2005 and Writ  Appeal  No.410 of  

2005.

3. The basic fact involved in this matter is not in dispute.

On  or  about  13.2.1998  The  Government  of  Tamil  Nadu  issued  a  

Notification  bearing GOMs No.32 granting permission  for  installation  of  

statutes and erection of arches.  In terms thereof, requisitions, seeking for  

permission to put up of arches and the like, were submitted to the District  

Collector,  who,  on  receipt  thereof  was  required  to  get  reports  from the  

Divisional Engineer of the State Highways, District Superintendent of Police  

etc. On receipt of such reports and on being satisfied therewith, the District  

Collector could make recommendations so as to enable the Government to  

grant or refuse to grant the requisite permission.   

The Legislature of the State enacted the Tamil Nadu Highways Act,  

2001 (Tamil Nadu Act 34 of 2002 ) (hereinafter referred to for the sake of  

brevity  as  ‘the  Act’)   with  a  view  to  provide  for  declaration  of  certain  

highways to  be the  State  Highways.  It  came into  force  with  effect  from  

1.12.2002.   

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In exercise of its powers conferred upon the State Government under  

Section 3 of the Act, it, on or about 16.12.2003, issued a Notification being  

GOMs  No.250  declaring  some  of  the  roads  as  State  Highways,  Major  

District Roads and other District Roads.  The roads in question in this appeal  

are  Thuraiyur-Perambalur  Road  and  Thuraimangalam-Bungalow  Road.  

They have been classified as Major District Roads.  Both the roads were  

declared to be highways belonging to the Government.  

On or about 22.10.2004, one Mr. Ravichandran, President of Tamil  

Nadu Handloom and Textiles Development Corporation (respondent herein)  

requisitioned  the  Perambalur  Municipality  to  issue  a  ‘No  Objection  

Certificate’  for  the  purpose  of  erecting  arches  on  the  occasion  of  57th  

Birthday  Celebrations  of  the  Chief  Minister  at  two  places  outside  the  

boundary line of the abovementioned roads.  On or about 23.10.2004, the  

Executive  Officer,  Perambalur  Municipality  issued  a  No  Objection  

Certificate to construct the arches as per the abovesaid requisition on the  

condition that there would be no hindrance to the traffic.

On  or  about  24.11.2004,  the  Municipal  Council  vide  a  resolution  

dated 24.11.2004 granted its approval for grant of No Objection Certificate.  

Thereafter the requisition and the approval thereof were placed before the  

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District Collector, who, in terms of the guidelines issued in GOMs No.32  

called for reports from the Divisional Engineer of Highways, Ariyalur and  

the District Superintendent of Police.  The Divisional Engineer, Highways  

on 20.12.2004 sent a report to the District Collector stating that arches can  

be permitted to be put up at the said two places and that putting up of the  

arches  would  not  cause  any  hindrance  to  the  traffic  being  outside  the  

boundary  line  of  the  roads.   It  was  also  stated  in  the  report  that  an  

undertaking was obtained from Mr. Ravinchandran that in case of expansion  

of roads, he would remove the arches.  On or about 14.01.2005, the District  

Superintendent  of  Police  also  sent  his  report  recommending  grant  of  

permission for construction of arches.   

On  receipt  of  both  the  reports,  the  District  Collector  forwarded  a  

proposal to the Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu, State Highways  

recommending for the required permission.   

On  or  about  24.1.2005,  the  appellant  –  Ward  Councillor  of  

Perambalur Municipality filed a writ petition being WP No.2503 of 2005  

before the High Court of Madras praying, inter alia, for issuance of a writ of  

certiorari quashing the abovesaid No Objection Certificate.  A learned Single  

Judge of the High Court dismissed the said writ petition by its judgment and  

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order dated 14.2.2005 holding that the proposed constructions do not fall  

within  the  National  Highways  limits.   An  intra  court  appeal  being  WA  

No.410 of 2005 was preferred by the appellant on 18.2.2005.

On or about 22.2.2005, the Secretary to Government of Tamil Nadu,  

State Highways Department, taking into consideration the recommendation  

made  by  the  District  Collector  and  after  satisfying  himself  that  the  

guidelines  stipulated  in  GOMs  No.32  have  been  complied  with  granted  

permission to construct the arches.   

One Mr. N.G. Karunakaran, claiming himself to be the Secretary of  

the District Consumer Council, Perambalur, filed a writ petition being WP  

No.6820 of 2005 praying for issuance of a writ of mandamus forbearing the  

respondents from putting up of permanent arches.   

The Division Bench of the High Court by reason of the impugned  

judgment dismissed both the Writ  Appeal No.410 of 2005 as well as the  

Writ Petition No.6820 of 2005.

4. The appellants are, thus, before us.  

5. Assailing the judgment of the High Court, Mr. T.L.V. Iyer, learned  

senior  counsel  appearing on behalf  of  the  appellant,  would urge that  the  

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High Court committed a serious error in holding that Section 26 of the Act  

does not deal with a permanent structure and the same comes within the  

purview of GOMs No.32.  Sub-section (1) of Section 26 of the Act being  

clearly applicable, it was contended, that no sanction could be granted by the  

State in terms of GOMs No.32 or otherwise.  It was furthermore urged that,  

in a case of this nature, doctrine of public trust would be applicable.

6. Learned  counsel  for  the  Municipal  Corporation  has  drawn  our  

attention to a resolution dated 10.6.2008 passed by it in terms whereof the  

lands in question are sought to be acquired.

7. Learned  counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  the  National  Highways  

contended that a project of making the State Highway or four lane road had  

been taken up and the same has been completed.   

8. Learned counsel for the State Highways adopted the submission of the  

learned counsel.

9. Mr. C.S. Vaidhyanathan, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf  

of Respondent Nos.1 and 6, on the other hand, would contend:

i) Assuming  that  constructions  of  permanent  structures  would  

attract the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 26, the same  

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deserves strict construction and as permission had been granted  

by the State, the constructions made by way of arches cannot be  

construed  to  be  an  encroachment  within  the  meaning  of  the  

provisions of the said Act.   

ii. If a literal meaning to sub-section (1) of Section 26 is assigned,  

no over-bridge can also be constructed for the pedestrians nor  

any signboard can be put up for the benefit of the public.  The  

constructions having been made far away from the tar road, the  

impugned judgment should be upheld.   

iii. Appellant having not challenged the validity of the order passed  

by  the  State  Government  granting  permission  to  put  up  the  

arches  in  the  writ  petition,  this  Court  may  not  interfere  

therewith in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the  

Constitution of India.

iv. The appellant No.2 has wrongly described himself as a member  

of the District Consumer Council as the said Council has been  

wound up long back.   

v. The appellants being belonging to the rival political parties, the  

writ petitions have been filed mala fide.

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10. The preamble of the said Act reads as under:

“An Act to provide for the declaration of certain  highways  to  be  State  highways,  restriction  of  ribbon  development  along  such  highways,  prevention and removal of encroachment thereon,  construction  maintenance  and  development  of  highways, and levy of betterment charges and for  matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.”

Indisputably,  the said legislation seeks to  regulate  the  roads in  the  

State other than the National highways.  It was enacted with a view to fix  

building  and  control  lines  of  such  roads,  to  declare  such  roads  as  State  

Highways,  Major  District  Roads  and  Village  Roads,  to  prevent  any  

encroachment  on  such  State  Highways,  to  acquire  required  lands  for  

formation and development of the State Highways.  It was also considered  

necessary  that  the  State  Highways  Authorities  are  vested  with  statutory  

powers to undertake such measures in the public interest.

Section 2(8) of the said Act defines ‘encroachment’ to mean :

(8)  “encroachment”  means  any  unauthorised  occupation  of  any  highway  or  Land  where  the  construction  of  a  highway  is  undertaken  or  proposed  to  be  undertaken  or  part  thereof,  and  includes any unauthorised—

(a) erection of a building or any other structure,  balcony,  porch or projection on or over or  overhanging the highways or part thereof; or

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(b) occupation  of  such  highway  of  such  land,  after  the  expiry  of  the  period  for  which  permission  was  granted  for  any  temporary  use under this Act; or

(c) excavation  of  embankments  of  any  sort  made or extended on such highways or part  thereof or underneath such highway or part  thereof.”

Section 2(12) defines ‘highway’ as under:

“(12)  “highway”  means  any  road,  way  or  land  which is declared to be a highway under section 3  and includes—

(a) all  land  appurtenant  thereto,  whether  demarcated or not;

(b) the  slope,  berm,  burrow  pits,  foot  paths,  pavement, whether surfaced or unsurfaced;

(c) all  bridges,  culverts,  causeways,  carriageways or other structures built on or  across such road or way;

(d) the  foot-way  attached  to  any  road,  public  bridge or cause way;

(e) the drains attached to any such street, public  bridge or cause way and the land, whether  covered or not by any pavement, varanda or  other structure, which lies on either side of  the  roadway  up  to  the  boundaries  of  the  adjacent  property,  whether  that  property  is  private or property belonging to the Central  Government or any State Government ; and  

(f) all  fences,  trees,  posts  and  boundaries,  hectometer  and kilometer  stones  and other  

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highway  accessories  and  materials  stacked  on such road or public bridge or causeway,

but does not include a National Highway declared  as such by or under the National Highways Act,  1956.

The term ‘Highway Authority’ is defined under Section 2(13) of the  

said Act to mean  the officer appointed under sub-section (2) of section 5  

thereof.  Section 2(14) defines ‘highway boundary’ to mean the highways  

boundary as may be fixed under section 8.

Section 2(18) defines ‘middle of a highway’ to mean :

(18) “middle of a highway” means the point half  way  between  the  boundaries  of  the  highway  in  relation  to  any  highway  for  the  improvement  of  which plans have been prepared by the Highways  authority, the middle of the highway as proposed  to be improved in accordance with the plans or the  point  half  way  between  the  boundaries  of  the  highway”

In terms of Section 2(19), an ‘occupier’ includes :

“(a) any person who for the time being is paying  or is liable to pay to the owner rent or any  portion of the rent of the premises in respect  of which such rent is paid or is payable; or

(b) a  owner  living  in  or  otherwise  using  his  premises; or

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(c) a rent free tenant; or

(d) a licensee in occupation of any premises; or

(e) any person who is liable to pay to the owner  damages for the use and occupation of any  premises.”

Section 3 empowers the State Government to declare any road, way or  

line to be a highway and classify it as any of the following :

(i) A State Highway;

(ii) A major district road;

(iii) Other district road; or

(iv) A village road.

on  the  recommendations  made  by  the  state  Highway  Authorities.  

Chapter III of the Act provides for the restriction of ribbon development.  

The Highway authority of any division is empowered to issue a notification  

in relation to any highway or any area in that division where the construction  

or  development  of  highway is  undertaken  or  proposed to  be undertaken,  

fixing:

“(a) the  highway  boundary,  building  line,  or  control line; or

(b) the highway boundary and the building line; and

(c) the building line and the control line.”

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Section 9 provides for restriction on building.   

Chapter  V  of  the  said  Act  provides  for  prevention  of  

unauthorized  occupation  of  and  encroachment  on  a  Highway  and  

removal of encroachment in the following terms :

“26. Prevention  of  unauthorized  occupation  of  highway.—(1) No person shall occupy or encroach  on any highway within the highway boundaries.

(2)  Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  sub- section (1), the Highways authority may, with the  concurrence of the Collector and with due regard  to the safety and convenience of traffic and subject  to such conditions, and on payment of such rent or  other  charges  as  may  be  prescribed,  grant  permission, of a temporary nature, to any person—

(a) to make any temporary use of any highway in  front of any building owned or occupied by him  or make a temporary structure overhanging the  highway; or  

(b) to put up a temporary owning or tent, pandal or  other  similar  erection  or  a  temporary  stall  or  scaffolding on any highway; or  

(c) to  deposit  or  cause  to  be  deposited  building  materials, goods for sale or other articles on any  highway for a specified period; or

(d) to  make  a  temporary  excavation  on  any  highway  for  carrying  out  any  repairs  or  improvements  to  building  on  lands  adjoining  such highway:

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Provided  that  no  such  permission  shall  be  deemed to be valid beyond a period of one year,  unless  it  is  expressly  renewed  by  the  Highways  authority.

(3) The  permission  granted  under  sub-section  (2) shall  clearly specify the date upto which and  the  purpose  for  which  the  occupation  of  the  highway is authorised and the exact portion of the  highway  so  permitted  to  be  occupied,  and  shall  also be accompanied by a plan or sketch of that  portion  of  the  highway.   A  copy  of  such  permission shall be communicated to the Collector  for the purpose of record.  

(4) The person in whose favour such permission  has  been  given  shall  produce  the  permit  for  inspection whenever called upon to do so by the  Highways authority, or any officer authorised  by  it in that behalf and shall, at the end of the period  specified in the permit,  vacate the portion of the  highway occupied by him, after restoring it to the  same  state  as  it  originally  stood  before  the  occupation by him.  

(5) The  Highways  authority  shall  maintain  a  complete  record of  all  such permissions  granted,  and shall  also cause an inspection to be made in  every  case  at  the  expiration  of  the  period  upto  which  such  occupation  has  been  permitted,  to  ensure that the portion of the highway has actually  been vacated.  

(6) The  permission  granted  under  sub-section  (2)  shall  be  in  such  form  and  subject  to  such  conditions as may be prescribed.”  

Section 49 of the said Act provides for a penalty, stating  

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“49.  Unauthorised  occupation  of  highway.— Whoever—  

(a) occupies or makes any encroachment on any  highway in contravention of the provisions  of section 26: or

(b) Fails  to  comply with  the  notice  served on  him under clause (ii)  of sub-section (2)  of  section  28,  shall  on  conviction,  be  punishable—

(i) for  the  first  offence with fine which  may  extend  to  two  hundred  rupees;  and  

(ii) for any subsequent offence in relation  to the same encroachment,  with fine  which  may  extend  to  five  hundred  rupees  plus  a  further  fine  not  exceeding  fifty  rupees  per  day  on  which such occupation of the highway  or encroachment continues.”

11. Sub-section  (1)  of  section  26  having  been  couched  in  negative  

language must be construed to be imperative in character.  The mandatory  

nature  of  the  said  provision  is  also  evident  from  the  penal  provisions  

contained in Section 49 of the Act.   

The High Court, however, in its impugned judgment, upon taking into  

consideration the provisions of the Act as also the Rules framed thereunder,  

opined:

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“51. However,  in  the  instant  case,  neither  permission  is  sought  for  either  for  putting  up  a  structure  of  temporary nature  in any highway or  overhanging the highway nor permission is sought  for a particular period under Form ‘A’ or any rate  has been fixed under Rule 8.  In other words, there  are  no  provisions  under  the  Act  or  the  Rules  framed  under  the  Act,  to  deal  with  statues  or  arches, which are to be installed or put up in the  highways, as a permanent structure.

52. As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  petitioner  N.G.  Karunakaran, in W.P. No.6820 of 2005, himself, in  his prayer, would seek for a mandamus, forbearing  the  respondents  from  permitting/putting  up  of  permanent  arches at  the  four  road  junction  of  Perambalur  and  the  three  road  junction  of  Thuraimangalam.  As such, it is nobody’s case that  the putting up of arches in the said two placed is  either  of  a  temporary  nature  or  to  make  any  temporary  use  of  any  highway  or  make  a  temporary structure overhanging the highway.”

53. Since the construction of arches sought to be  put up is of a permanent nature, we are of the view  that G.O.Ms. No.32, Highways Department, dated  13.02.1998, alone would be applicable, as it would  deal with statutes and arches exclusively.”

The High Court, however, noticed that permission had been granted to  

put up arches at both the places, giving the specific measurement, allowing  

for putting up middle pillars in the middle of the roads finding that although  

putting up of arches would not prevent the free flow of traffic but putting up  

of middle pillars in both the arches would certainly cover the middle space  

of tar road portion in which event there may not be free flow of traffic to  

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pass or repass.  It view of the aforementioned finding, it issued, inter alia,  

the following direction :

“57. Therefore,  we  direct  the  Government  to  allow the arches to be put up at both the places  without  middle  pillars,  by  giving  sufficient  strength to  the  either  side pillars,  to have a  grip  over the arches, overhanging the highways.”

The High Court summed up its judgment as under :

“(1) The prayers sought for in W.P. No.6820 of  2005 and w.A. No.410 of 2005 are not sustainable.

(2) In  view  of  G.O.Ms.  No.250,  Highways  (NH2),  dated  16.12.2003,  declaring  the  roads  in  question  as  Highways  belonging  to  the  State  Government, the provisions of Sections 180, 180- A,  181  and  182  of  the  Tamil  Nadu  District  Municipalities Act, 1920, are not applicable.

(3) The Tamil Nadu Highways Act, 2001, is not  applicable  with  reference  to  the  permission  for  installation of arches, in view of G.O.Ms. No.32,  Highways  Department,  dated  13.02.1998,  which  would exclusively govern the same.

(4) Permission,  granted  by  the  Secretary  to  Government  of  Tamil  Nadu,  Highways  Department, on the basis of the recommendation of  the Divisional  Engineer  of the said Division and  the District Collector, is perfectly valid.

(5) State  Government  is  directed  to  allow the  arches  to  be  put  up  of  both  the  places  without  middle pillars, by giving sufficient strength to the  either side pillars, to have a grip over the arches,  

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overhanging the highways, so that the public use  the  entire  portion  of  the  tar  road,  to  pass  and  repass.”

12. We, with respect, are not in a position to persuade ourselves to agree  

with the opinion of the Hon’ble High Court.

13. Sub-section (1) of Section 26, as noticed hereinbefore, is mandatory in  

character.  Sub-section (2) of Section 26 is an exception to Sub-section (1)  

of Section 26.

The provisions  of  Section 26 with  a  view to  prevent  unauthorized  

occupation of highway or encroachment thereof would, however, apply to  

third  parties  and  not  to  the  Highway  authorities.   The  power  to  grant  

permission for erecting any arch or any other constructions strictly lies with  

the Highway authority.   

The State, after coming into force of the said Act, is denuded of its  

power in the matter of grant of any permission.   The High Court, in our  

opinion, thus, committed a manifest error in holding that the State would  

exercise its jurisdiction of in terms of GOMs No.32.

14. Mr.  Vaidyanathan  would  contend  that  no  encroachment  has  been  

caused having regard to the fact that the width of the road being 14 meters  

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and  the  recommendations  having  been  given  to  construct  the  arches  as  

mentioned in the sketch map, i.e. 9.25 meters away from the Taar Salai on  

both the sides and the height of the same should not be less than 6.60 meters  

to be supported by a pillar, the same would not come within the purview of  

the term ‘encroachment’ as defined in the said Act.   

The State in its order contained in GOMs No.A6/13173/2004 noticed  

that both the arches are to be maintained by Perambalur District Kuzhagam.  

It furthermore noticed that the respondent himself has given an undertaking  

that  if  any  hindrance  is  caused  to  the  concerned  Department  during  the  

course of the widening of the road, he shall be responsible for the removal  

thereof.

15. We  would  assume  that  having  regard  to  the  definition  of  

encroachment as contained in Section 2(8) of the Act, any construction made  

with permission would not come within the purview thereof.  We would also  

assume that the provisions of Section 2(8), Section 8 and Section 26 of the  

Act are required to be construed harmoniously.  Notice may also be taken of  

the fact that the State of Tamil Nadu had granted permission for erection of  

such arches throughout the State.   Such permissions, inter alia,  are being  

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granted for construction of  arches in honour of its  leaders or  God or for  

depicting the name of the place.   

16. Before us, the details of such arches and/or the photographs thereof  

have also been produced.  We, however, fail to understand as to why the  

State shall grant permission to erect such arches at the instance of a private  

party.  The State, being the principal protector of the rights of its citizens,  

keeping in view the doctrine of public trust as adumbrated by this Court in a  

large number of decisions,  including  M.C. Mehta v.  Kamal  Nath & Ors.  

[(1997) 1 SCC 388]; M.I. Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. Radhey Shyam Sahu & Ors.  

[(1999) 6 SCC 464] and  Intellectuals Forum, Tirupathi v.  State of A.p. &  

Ors. [2006 (2) SCALE 494], should not have granted such permission.  In  

any event, with the coming into force of the said Act, GOMs 32 must be  

held  to  have  been  repealed.   The  State  Government,  therefore,  had  no  

jurisdiction to pass the order impugned in the writ application.   

17. In a public interest litigation of this nature, it is not necessary for the  

Court to abide by the strict rules of pleadings and even if it is found that the  

petitioners  are  busy  bodies,  the  courts  while  discharging  them,  could  

proceed to deal with the public interest litigation suo motu.   

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In  Nirmal Singh Kahlon v.  State of Punjab & Ors. [(2009) 1 SCC  

441], this Court held :

“The  High  Court  while  entertaining  the  writ  petition formed a  prima facie opinion as regards  the  systematic  commission  of  fraud.   While  dismissing the  writ  petition filed by the  selected  candidates,  it  initiated a suo motu public interest  litigation.  It was entitled to do so.  The nature of  jurisdiction exercised by the High Court, as is well  known,  in  a  private  interest  litigation  and  in  a  public interest litigation is different.  Whereas in  the latter it is inquisitorial in nature, in the former  it is adversarial.  In a public interest litigation, the  court  need  not  strictly  follow  the  ordinary  procedure.  It may not only appoint committees but  also issue directions upon the State from time to  time.  (See Indian Bank v. Godhara Nagrik Coop.  Credit  Society Ltd. and  Raju Ramsing Vasave v.  Mahesh Deorao Bhivapurkar).”

{See also Indian Bank v. Godhara Nagrik Cooperative Credit Society  

Ltd.  & Anr. [(2008) 12 SCC 541] and  Raju Ramsing Vasave v.  Mahesh  

Deorao Bhivapurkar & Ors. [(2008) 9 SCC 54]}

18. When questioned that even assuming that encroachment is not made  

on the surface of the building line but may be in the air in view of well  

settled principle of law that he who possesses the land possesses also having  

regard to the maxim cedificatum solo solo cedi;. Our attention was drawn  

by Mr. Vaidyanathan to the following passage from Broom’s Legal Maxim:

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“It may be noticed, in conclusion, that the maxim  under  consideration  does  not  apply  in  favour  of  local  authorities,  in  whom streets  are  vested  by  virtue of the Public Health Act, 1875, Section 149,  or any similar enactment.  Such enactments vest in  the authority such property only as is necessary for  the  control,  protection  and  maintenance  of  the  streets as highways for public use, and confer no  general proprietary rights in the air  above or the  ground  below  the  streets.  [Tunbridge  wells v.  Baird [(1896) AC 434].”

The English Law with regard to the limited right vested in the local  

authorities under the Public Health Act, 1875 is not applicable in India.  The  

authorities acquired the land in terms of the provisions of the Act.  The roads  

vest in the authorities in terms of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act  

or the provisions of the State Highways Act or similar other statutes free  

from all encumbrances.  It is just not a case where a limited right is vested  

by the State as a Local Authority.   

However, there cannot be any doubt or dispute whatsoever that the  

authorities in the interest  of general public and pedestrians and others,  in  

particular,  may grant permission to construct such buildings even if it  be  

permanent  in character  as it  may seem fit  or  carry out such construction  

itself  as  it  may  seem  necessary.  What  is,  however,  important  is  public  

interest  in  carrying  out  such construction  and not  any private  interest  or  

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interest  of  a  political  party.   The  doctrine  of  good  governance,  in  our  

opinion, requires the Government to rise above their political interest and act  

only in public interest and for welfare of its people.

19. For the reasons aforementioned,  the  impugned judgment cannot  be  

sustained.  It is set aside accordingly.  The appeals are allowed with costs  

payable  by  the  Respondent  Nos.  1  and  6.   Counsel’s  fee  assessed  at  

Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty thousand only)

..………………………J.     [S.B. Sinha]

..………………………J.     [Deepak Verma]

New Delhi; July 31 , 2009   

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